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That	  gender	  would	  be	  central	  to	  both	  revolutionary	  and	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  processes	  and	  developments	  in	  Egypt,	  as	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  region,	  did	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  me,	  nor	  to	  any	  feminist	  scholar	  or	  activist	  with	  historical	  knowledge	  of	  the	  region	  and	  other	  comparable	  contexts.	  After	  an	  initial	  phase	  of	  anti-­‐Mubarak	  and	  nationalist	  sentiments	  subsuming	  and	  glossing	  over	  specific	  gendered	  concerns	  and	  interests	  –	  “We	  are	  here	  as	  Egyptian	  citizens	  not	  as	  women”	  –	  feminist	  interventions	  and	  voices	  became	  louder	  and	  more	  central.	  From	  8	  March	  2011	  (International	  Women’s	  Day)	  onwards,	  it	  became	  obvious	  that	  body	  politics	  and	  feminist	  resistance	  would	  constitute	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  political	  contestations	  in	  post-­‐Mubarak	  Egypt.	  	  Women	  of	  all	  social	  and	  political	  backgrounds	  became	  increasingly	  politicized	  and	  mobilized	  around	  specific	  forms	  of	  gender-­‐based	  violence.	  This	  in	  a	  context	  where	  the	  remnants	  of	  the	  Mubarak	  regime,	  as	  well	  as	  SCAF	  (the	  Supreme	  Council	  of	  Armed	  Forces),	  clearly	  tried	  to	  use	  women’s	  bodies,	  gender	  norms	  and	  prevailing	  ideas	  about	  gender	  relations	  as	  a	  way	  to	  control,	  govern	  and	  intimidate	  protesters.	  The	  most	  prominent	  case	  was	  that	  of	  forced	  virginity	  testing	  by	  a	  military	  doctor,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  response	  of	  Samira	  Ibrahim,	  one	  of	  the	  victims,	  who,	  instead	  of	  staying	  silent	  in	  shame,	  resisted	  by	  going	  to	  court.	  Another	  high-­‐profile	  case	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	  “woman	  in	  a	  blue	  bra”	  who	  was	  beaten	  and	  kicked	  while	  lying	  helpless	  on	  the	  street	  with	  her	  blue	  bra	  visible.	  The	  incident	  was	  immediately	  followed	  by	  a	  large-­‐scale	  protest	  and	  solidarity	  demonstration	  by	  women	  in	  Cairo,	  united	  across	  class,	  generations	  and	  political	  and	  religious	  persuasion.	  Increasingly,	  from	  the	  end	  of	  2012	  onwards,	  the	  sexual	  harassment	  of	  female	  protesters	  as	  well	  as	  wider	  instances	  of	  harassment	  have	  taken	  centre	  stage,	  both	  amongst	  feminist	  activists	  and	  within	  the	  media	  coverage	  of	  events.	  	  	  	  	  	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  those	  of	  us	  commenting	  on	  developments	  in	  Egypt	  from	  a	  feminist	  perspective	  have	  argued	  that	  contestations	  about	  gender	  norms	  and	  relations	  are	  not	  a	  side-­‐show	  to	  revolutionary	  and	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  processes	  and	  developments,	  but	  are	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  it.	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti	  (2013),	  for	  example,	  provocatively	  called	  the	  fierce	  backlash	  by	  the	  military	  and	  the	  remnants	  of	  old	  regimes	  “masculinist	  restoration”:	  at	  a	  time	  when	  patriarchy	  as	  usual	  no	  longer	  functions,	  the	  desperate	  attempts	  to	  maintain	  the	  old	  rule	  often	  take	  on	  very	  nasty	  and	  violent	  forms.	  	  	  	  Without	  doubt,	  the	  rapidly	  changing	  constellations	  and	  dynamics	  around	  gender	  and	  feminist	  positions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  wider	  political	  developments	  over	  the	  last	  few	  months	  have	  been	  mind-­‐boggling.	  While	  my	  own	  observations	  and	  analysis	  were	  until	  recently	  firmly	  grounded	  in	  my	  transnational	  feminist	  ethics	  and	  politics,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  knowledge	  about	  comparative	  conditions	  historically	  (Al-­‐Ali,	  2012,	  forthcoming),	  I	  have	  to	  admit	  that	  I	  am	  currently	  at	  a	  loss	  as	  to	  what,	  in	  the	  current	  Egyptian	  context,	  an	  adequate	  transnational	  feminist	  strategy	  and	  position	  looks	  like.	  	  	  	  After	  the	  violent	  crackdown	  on	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  the	  removal	  of	  Morsi,	  and	  the	  ascendancy	  and	  popularity	  of	  General	  El-­‐Sisi	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  military	  more	  broadly,	  I	  find	  myself	  struggling	  to	  understand	  the	  confidence	  that	  has	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been	  shown	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  military,	  and	  the	  limited	  condemnation	  of	  its	  violent	  tactics	  amongst	  many	  Egyptian	  activists	  and	  intellectuals.	  I	  have	  no	  problem	  relating	  to	  their	  disdain	  and	  even	  hatred	  for	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  whose	  politics	  and	  actions	  were	  anything	  but	  democratic	  and	  inclusive.	  Nor	  did	  they	  try	  to	  solve	  any	  of	  Egypt’s	  most	  pressing	  economic	  and	  social	  problems.	  Yet,	  I	  have	  to	  admit	  that	  I	  am	  astonished	  at	  some	  of	  the	  political,	  intellectual	  and	  ethical	  acrobatics	  that	  have	  emerged	  over	  the	  past	  months	  to	  justify	  support	  of	  the	  military.	  Obviously	  there	  exists	  a	  range	  of	  views	  in	  Egypt.	  But	  I	  was	  quite	  shocked	  by	  the	  initial	  reactions	  of	  some	  of	  my	  feminist	  friends	  and	  colleagues	  in	  Egypt,	  whose	  hatred	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  seemed	  to	  have	  translated	  into	  an	  initially	  uncritical	  applauding	  of	  its	  violent	  suppression,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  glorification	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  military	  as	  “the	  will	  of	  the	  people”.	  	  	  Let	  me	  add	  here	  that	  I	  do	  feel	  uncomfortable	  about	  sitting	  in	  London	  and	  making	  recommendations	  to,	  or	  even	  worse	  passing	  judgement	  about,	  my	  feminist	  colleagues	  and	  friends	  in	  Egypt.	  I	  continue	  to	  feel	  humbled	  and	  profoundly	  impressed	  by	  their	  resourcefulness,	  commitment	  and	  resolve.	  I	  am	  also	  deeply	  aware	  that	  things	  look	  different	  from	  the	  inside,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  always	  easier	  to	  have	  “principled”	  and	  righteous	  positions	  sitting	  in	  a	  safe	  haven	  in	  London	  or	  New	  York,	  or	  in	  Copenhagen,	  Stockholm	  or	  Oslo	  for	  that	  matter.	  	  	  That	  things	  are	  often	  more	  complex	  than	  they	  might	  appear	  from	  the	  outside,	  I	  learnt	  in	  the	  context	  of	  my	  research	  and	  activism	  in	  relation	  to	  Iraq.	  I	  have	  lost	  several	  friends	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years	  whose	  anti-­‐imperialist	  and	  anti-­‐occupation	  positions	  translated	  into	  fierce	  criticism	  of	  feminist	  activists	  (or	  any	  other	  activist	  and	  intellectual	  for	  that	  matter)	  who	  participated	  in	  any	  political	  processes	  or	  transition	  instigated	  by	  either	  the	  occupation	  forces	  or	  a	  government	  lacking	  widespread	  legitimacy.	  For	  some	  of	  my	  friends	  in	  London,	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  diaspora,	  those	  Iraqis	  who	  worked	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  or	  engaged	  in	  any	  form	  of	  exchange	  with	  the	  occupation	  were	  traitors	  and	  were	  not	  to	  be	  trusted.	  My	  position	  was	  different	  and	  so	  I	  also	  became	  a	  traitor	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  some,	  although	  I	  have	  always	  upheld	  my	  anti-­‐occupation	  position.	  I	  just	  did	  not	  think	  that	  it	  was	  either	  fair	  or	  realistic	  to	  expect	  people	  inside	  the	  country,	  living	  under	  occupation	  and	  an	  undemocratic	  government,	  not	  to	  try	  to	  influence	  processes	  and	  developments.	  Non-­‐violent	  forms	  of	  resistance	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  context	  have	  in	  practice	  also	  involved	  engagement	  in	  the	  political	  process.	  And	  what	  other	  options,	  short	  of	  taking	  up	  arms	  and	  joining	  the	  armed	  resistance,	  do	  ordinary	  people	  have	  when	  trying	  to	  influence	  political	  developments?	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  tend	  to	  disagree	  with	  Judith	  Butler’s	  position,	  which	  emerged	  when	  she	  was	  invited	  in	  late	  September	  2013	  to	  talk	  at	  Boğaziçi	  University	  in	  Istanbul	  to	  a	  group	  of	  students	  about	  the	  freedom	  of	  assembly.	  Butler	  refused	  to	  comment	  directly	  on	  the	  Gezi	  protests,	  proclaiming	  her	  lack	  of	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  foreign	  commentator	  on	  local	  events	  (Moth,	  2013).	  While	  I	  appreciate	  Butler’s	  humility	  and	  sensitivity	  in	  avoiding	  the	  frequently	  patronizing	  commentaries	  of	  western-­‐based	  academics	  and	  so-­‐called	  experts,	  I	  am	  personally	  troubled	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  you	  need	  to	  be	  there	  and	  from	  there	  to	  speak	  with	  credibility	  and	  authority.	  It	  reminds	  me	  too	  much	  of	  the	  essentialist	  identity	  politics	  of	  the	  early	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90s:	  you	  need	  to	  be	  black	  to	  comment	  on	  racism.	  Butler’s	  position	  risks	  negating	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  transnational	  feminist	  solidarity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  someone	  who	  has	  looked	  at	  a	  range	  of	  historical	  and	  current	  contexts	  of	  protest	  and	  resistance	  might	  be	  able	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  specific	  local	  struggles.	  Also,	  the	  flip	  side	  of	  a	  refusal	  to	  comment	  directly	  on	  events	  is	  a	  reifying	  of	  positions	  of	  authenticity,	  which	  inevitably	  involves	  the	  exclusion	  of	  dissenting	  voices	  from	  within.	  	  	  This	  growing	  trend	  in	  Egypt	  has	  translated	  into	  a	  vilification	  of	  western	  media	  and	  western	  academics,	  who	  in	  reality	  represent	  a	  range	  of	  political	  views	  and	  express	  radically	  different	  analyses.	  Yet,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  Egyptians,	  including	  many	  feminists,	  there	  exists	  a	  concerted	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  western	  powers	  to	  discredit	  “the	  will	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  people”,	  and	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  military	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  the	  widely	  hated	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  The	  West	  does	  not	  understand,	  the	  argument	  goes,	  and	  blindly	  supports	  the	  Brotherhood	  by	  calling	  what	  was	  another	  instance	  of	  revolution,	  a	  coup.	  	  	  Certainly,	  western	  media	  and	  commentators	  often	  get	  things	  wrong,	  and	  the	  situation	  in	  Egypt,	  as	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  more	  broadly,	  is	  very	  complex	  and	  requires	  a	  historical	  understanding	  as	  well	  as	  a	  grasp	  of	  current	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  conditions.	  However,	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  analyses	  and	  comments	  in	  the	  English-­‐language	  press,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  on-­‐line	  fora,	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  views	  and	  political	  positions	  available	  under	  the	  heading	  “western”.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  am	  increasingly	  suspicious	  and	  unconvinced	  by	  proclamations	  of	  “the	  will	  of	  the	  people”,	  given	  that	  Egyptians	  have	  very	  different	  views	  and	  ideas	  about	  recent	  events	  and	  the	  future	  of	  Egypt.	  Whose	  voices	  and	  views	  count	  as	  those	  of	  “the	  people”?	  Do	  supporters	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  lie	  outside	  this	  category?	  Or	  those	  who	  want	  things	  to	  go	  back	  to	  “normal”	  and	  who	  are	  already	  nostalgic	  for	  the	  Mubarak	  regime?	  And	  what	  about	  those	  groups	  and	  activists	  who	  have	  opposed	  both	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  the	  military’s	  coup	  and	  brutal	  crackdown,	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Third	  Space”?	  	  	  	  	  From	  a	  feminist	  perspective,	  we	  are	  already	  aware	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  “the	  people”	  often	  glosses	  over	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  might	  be	  different	  gendered	  interests	  at	  stake.	  A	  transnational	  feminist	  perspective	  looks	  more	  carefully	  at	  how	  gender	  intersects	  with	  other	  hierarchies	  of	  power	  and	  systems	  of	  inequality.	  In	  the	  current	  political	  context,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  struggle	  against	  gender-­‐based	  inequalities	  in	  legislation,	  the	  widespread	  sexual	  harassment	  of	  women,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  women	  from	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  etc.,	  intersect	  with	  the	  prevailing	  political	  culture	  and	  practices	  of	  authoritarianism	  as	  well	  as	  neo-­‐liberal	  economic	  policies	  and	  practices	  that	  contribute	  to	  a	  profound	  economic	  crisis,	  high	  unemployment	  rates,	  and	  widespread	  poverty	  while	  also	  lining	  the	  pockets	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  economic	  elite.	  	  	  But	  how	  do	  we	  translate	  this	  theoretical	  recognition	  into	  our	  political	  solidarities	  and	  practices?	  Here	  I	  have	  to	  acknowledge	  my	  current	  state	  of	  ambivalence	  and	  doubt.	  Do	  we	  express	  our	  support	  and	  push	  in	  transnational	  fora	  for	  greater	  representation	  of	  women	  and,	  particularly,	  feminist	  voices,	  in	  the	  current	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decision-­‐making	  processes?	  Or	  do	  we	  stress	  the	  authoritarian	  and	  undemocratic	  nature	  of	  the	  political	  transition	  as	  led	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  military	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  ousting	  of	  Morsi	  and	  the	  crackdown	  on	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood?	  I	  was	  rather	  torn	  in	  my	  reaction	  when	  I	  heard	  that	  a	  feminist	  academic	  and	  activist	  I	  greatly	  respect	  and	  admire	  was	  one	  of	  only	  five	  women	  appointed	  to	  the	  50-­‐member-­‐strong	  constituent	  assembly	  in	  September	  2013.	  The	  assembly	  is	  charged	  with	  amending	  the	  existing	  constitution,	  which	  was	  drafted	  during	  the	  presidency	  of	  Morsi.	  The	  constitution	  was	  heavily	  criticized	  by	  secularists	  and	  liberals	  for	  the	  weight	  given	  to	  Islam	  and	  its	  strong	  Islamist	  undertones.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  I	  was	  therefore	  pleased	  that	  my	  inspiring	  colleague,	  whose	  insights	  and	  expertise	  go	  far	  beyond	  a	  simple	  “add	  women	  and	  stir”	  approach,	  was	  going	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  reviewing	  the	  existing	  constitution	  and	  suggesting	  amendments.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  I	  felt	  extremely	  worried	  and	  uncomfortable.	  How	  can	  we	  condone	  a	  political	  process	  and	  that	  is	  based	  on	  a	  military	  coup	  with	  the	  collusion	  of	  a	  large	  section	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  population,	  who,	  by	  and	  large,	  did	  not	  condemn	  the	  disproportionate	  use	  of	  force	  and	  violence	  that	  were	  used	  to	  end	  the	  protests	  by	  supporters	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood?	  I	  do	  not	  for	  a	  second	  believe	  that	  General	  El-­‐Sisi,	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  military	  more	  widely,	  are	  interested	  in	  either	  women’s	  or	  human	  rights,	  or	  the	  democratic	  values	  and	  ideas	  of	  freedom,	  dignity	  and	  respect	  associated	  with	  the	  revolutionary	  movement.	  	  	  Historically,	  feminists	  in	  the	  region	  have	  on	  many	  occasions	  aligned	  themselves	  with	  authoritarian	  and	  undemocratic	  regimes	  (Egypt	  under	  Mubarak,	  Tunisia	  under	  Ben	  Ali	  and	  Iraq	  under	  Saddam	  Hussein	  being	  amongst	  the	  many	  examples).	  They	  worked	  with	  regimes	  which,	  either	  as	  part	  of	  their	  modernizing	  projects	  or	  as	  ways	  to	  clamp	  down	  on	  Islamist	  opposition,	  promoted	  aspects	  of	  greater	  gender	  equality	  and	  women’s	  rights.	  This	  led	  to	  achievements	  in	  women’s	  education,	  labour-­‐force	  participation	  and	  legal	  rights.	  However,	  we	  also	  know	  that	  it	  contributed	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  social	  conservatism	  and	  a	  backlash	  against	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  protests	  and	  developments	  that	  ousted	  many	  of	  the	  secular	  authoritarian	  regimes	  in	  the	  region.	  Currently,	  I	  worry	  about	  women’s	  rights	  and	  broader	  issues	  of	  personal	  freedom	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  only	  two	  Islamists	  were	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  amending	  the	  constitution.	  While	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  Egyptians	  supported	  the	  action	  of	  the	  military	  to	  oust	  Morsi,	  Islamists	  are	  still	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  Egypt’s	  political	  landscape.	  Moreover,	  the	  military	  itself,	  which	  is	  clearly	  pulling	  the	  strings	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  has	  already	  repeatedly	  illustrated	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  tramples	  over	  human	  and	  women’s	  rights	  and	  notions	  of	  democracy.	  	  	  I	  will	  disappoint	  anyone	  who	  expects	  me	  at	  this	  point	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  right	  and	  what	  is	  wrong.	  I,	  for	  myself,	  have	  decided	  to	  embrace	  ambivalence,	  doubt	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  not	  be	  righteous	  without	  denying	  my	  ability	  and	  competence	  to	  analyze,	  interpret	  and	  comment	  on	  unfolding	  events.	  I	  recognize	  that	  being	  “inside”	  is	  different	  and	  might	  require	  strategizing,	  and	  even	  a	  sense	  of	  pragmatism,	  in	  order	  to	  contain	  or	  influence	  existing	  political	  processes	  and	  developments.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  maintain	  that	  “the	  inside”	  is	  not	  only	  diverse	  and	  multi-­‐layered,	  but	  also	  contested	  and	  complex.	  There	  are,	  for	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example,	  many	  Egyptians,	  feminists,	  activists	  and	  intellectuals	  more	  broadly	  who	  refuse	  to	  be	  drawn	  into	  supporting	  the	  military	  just	  because	  they	  hate	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  I	  know	  that	  my	  colleague	  belongs	  to	  that	  group	  as	  well,	  but	  I	  suspect	  she	  also	  feels	  the	  need	  to	  take	  responsibility	  and	  be	  constructively	  involved,	  rather	  than	  merely	  stand	  by	  and	  criticize.	  I	  can	  see	  her	  point	  and	  respect	  it.	  Yet,	  I	  think	  that	  there	  has	  to	  be	  an	  intellectual	  and	  political	  space	  for	  those	  voices	  –	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  based	  inside	  or	  outside	  Egypt	  –	  that	  comment,	  analyze,	  and	  possibly	  even	  make	  suggestions	  outside	  of	  polarized	  and	  dichotomous	  political	  solutions.	  I	  would	  argue	  that,	  at	  this	  juncture,	  historical	  depth	  and	  knowledge	  about	  comparative	  empirical	  contexts	  are	  important	  assets	  and	  angles	  that	  should	  not	  be	  so	  easily	  dismissed	  as	  either	  out	  of	  touch	  or	  western.	  Simultaneously,	  those	  of	  us	  sitting	  comfortably	  and	  safely	  at	  our	  desks	  elsewhere	  around	  the	  globe	  could	  do	  with	  a	  dosage	  of	  humility	  and	  doubt.	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